In 1922 everything may have been simpler. In his introduction to Wittgenstein's Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, Bertrand Russell was able to write this kind of thing:
There is the question: what relation must one fact (such as a sentence) have to another in order to be capable of being a symbol for that other? [This] is a logical question ... [Wittgenstein] is concerned with the conditions for accurate Symbolism, i.e. for Symbolism in which a sentence 'means' something quite definite. In practice, language is always more or less vague ... [but] the whole function of language is to have meaning, and it only fulfils this function in proportion as it approaches to the ideal language which we postulate.
The next sentence is one of my favourites: "The essential business of language is to assert or deny facts." Today, this statement seems simple-minded, reductionist and just plain wrong. And we could even invoke (the later) Wittgenstein if we wanted to argue against it. But we have to keep Russell's qualification in mind: in practice, he grants, language is vague. He might also have granted that it is involved in many other kinds of business. He (and the early Wittgenstein) is here, in 1922, interested in the workings of a "logically perfect language".
I emphasize this passage because the interest in strictly logical problems allows us, it seems, to write simple, direct sentences. Consider, by contrast, the sentence I have been looking at over the last few posts:
Qualitative-constructivist methodology has a unique advantage for exploring the work of the symbolic in institutional processes as it stresses the embodiment of experience in shared sociolinguistic meanings and practices.
Because "the work of the symbolic" is not a simple business "in practice", it seems, we tend not to write simple sentences about it.
I thought I was going to be done with this sentence today, but I'm going to have to say a bit more on Monday.